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Draft Recommendation
on WEU's relations with Russia
Thc Asscmbh',
O Recalling that the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the rmportancc of WEU's rote as the European
defence organrsatron lntended to become, in the longer term and ln stages, the dcfcnce component of the
European Union,
0r) Recalhng also that NATO membcr countries agreed to develop a European security and defence
identitl' (ESDI) rvrthrn the Atlantic Alliance and that WEU must be an esscntial element of that
development.
0n) Stressrng that the modified Brussels Treaty contrnues to be an rmportant part of European
securitl,, as the WEU Ministerial Council expressll' recalled in rts Erfurt Declaratton;
0r) Recognrsrng that rt u'ould make no sense to discuss, much less to seek to promote securtty and
stabrlrtl, rn Europe u,rthout takrng the Russran Federatron rnto account as a factor of prime importance
in that area, ln vreu of rts potentral and the u'erght of rnfluence the countn' u relds tn Europe and, more
rvrdely,, on the mternatronal stage.
(v) Notrng that the Russran Federation rs strll rn thc throes of transformatron and redefinition of rts
role on the u'orld stage and, more particularli'. in European affarrs rncludrng matters relatrng to secunt\,,
(u,) Welcomrng progress achreved tn recent years as cvtdenced bv
(a) Russra. as the pnncrpal successor statc to thc former Sovret Unron. contrnuing to hold full
membershrp of the OSCE and even extendrng rts posrtron and rnfluence rn the organisation b1'
making a posrtive and constructrve contnbutron, ln conlunctron urth the other member states.
both to the management of specrfic crises and the preventron of certarn confltcts and to the
OSCE's oun development.
@ ever stronger institutional ties of partnershrp and cooperatron rl'hrch the Russtan Federation
has developed u'rth the European Union and NATO.
(c) Russia's accesslon to full membership of the Councrl of Europe. in other u'ords to the
organlsatlon also ivrth responsrbrlrty for the democratrc drmensron of secuntv rn Europe.
(vr) Welcomrng Russra's constructrve involvement 
- 
alongsrde rts othcr European partners 
- 
in the
efforts expended b1, the lnternatronal commurutv rn managrng a numbcr of cnses. tn pcacckeepmg,
espccralll' rn the Balkans, and rn the Contact Group, u'hrlc an'arc that Russra's polnts of vtew' or more
specrfic interests rn certarn conflrcts mav not alu'ay's corncrde fulll,rirth those of rts other European or
Amencan partners.
(wr) Convrnced that WEU should, Just as thc European Unron and NATO have done. cstablish
official relatrons u'rth Russra, bearrng m mind that the latter has on scveral occaslons made known tts
mterest rn consohdatrng and strengthenrng its exrstrng hnks wrth WEU.
(,x) Regrettrng therefore that the Council has taken no actron on Assembly' Recommendatron 574
proposmg that relations betu'een WEU and Russra be put on an rnstrtutional footrng. and that exrstrng
relatrons are as yet strll no more than sporadrc rnterchanges u'hrch do not match the Assembly's
expecLatrons,
(r) Convinced that establishrng a permanent, rnstrtutionahsed sy'stem of contacts betrveen WEU and
Russia is in the interests of Russia, of secunty in Europe as a rvhole, of Europe's transatlantic partners
and of WEU
(a) rnasmuch as such contacts are corrunensurate ri'ith the role of WEU as an essenttal factor
rn European securlt),construction, rn the broad sense of the term. and should therefore lead WEU
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to decpcn dralogue and coopcration with thc Russran Fedcratron. on the same basis at least and
rvrth thc same tntenstty' as other organrsations close to WEU. uhilc at thc samc trme bcrng awarc
that rts relattons wrth its Russran partner are unhkelr,'to be entrrelv tcnsron-frcc,
(b) tnasmuch as they offcr a further u'ay of reducing thc feehngs of rsolatron that thc Russrans
expcnence in consolidatrng the procoss of democratrc reform and strengthenrng the polrtrcal
stabihsatron golng on in the Federation, with a vle\4, to inducrng the latter rncreasinglv to become
a constructivc factor for secunty, stabrlity and peace in Europe,
@ inasmuch as such relations should be considered as a useful and necessary contribution to
building confidence and understanding between Russia and NATO's European and North
American partners;
(n) Consrderrng that giving relations between WEU and thc Russian Federatron an institutional
basis might create a precedent and a model that could be applied to WEU's relations with other states
rvith rvhrch the Organisation may r.,rsh to establish simrlar ties,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COLINCIL
I Takc a raprd dectston on a surtable formula that wrll allow a programtnc of regular rnformatron
exchange, dralogue and cooperatron to be set up wrth Russia:
2. Identrfl' u'rth the Russtan authorities the arcas of common intcrcst over uhrch mutual consultatron
u'ould bc appropnate and sphcres rn ri,hich practical cooperatron mrght applr',
3 Put relattons betrveen WEU and thc Russran Federatron on a perrnanent rnstrtutronal basis by
such means as secm most appropriatc
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Draft Order
on WEU's relations with Russia
The Assembll',
0 Considcrrng the report of its Polrtrcal Committee on WEU's relatrons urth Russia;
(,,) Recalhng rn that context Order 95 adopted on I December 1994,
0,r) Resolved to make a contributron at parliamentary level towards puttrng relations between Russra
and WEU as a u'hole on a formal basis,
0, Considenng that a similar approach could subsequently be taken bv the Assembly following a
procedure u,hich the Presidential Committee mrght then extend to the Assembly's relations with the
parliaments of other states rvith which rt wished to establish simrlar permanent collaborative tres,
I DECIDES to take a first step in that drrection and to mstrtutronalise relatrons u,rth both chambers
of the Russran Parhament,
2 INVITES ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE to take, rn cooperatron rvrth the Rapporteur,
such measures as are necessan'to create a permanent status for the Russran Parliament so as to allorv a
set numbcr of representatrves thereof to particrpate regularll' rn plenan' sesslons of the Assembly and
possrblr ln commrttee mcetings
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Exp lan ato 11' M e mo ran du m
(submined by Mr Martinez, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I The role and place of the Russian Federa-
tion m Europe and a Euro-Atlantic securitl, sys-
tem ls a relatively open questron not only rn
Russia itself but also in Europe and the United
States The vast expanse of territory that it cov-
ers, stretching from the Baltrc to the Pacific and
the ethnrc. cultural and religious diversity of its
people mean that Russra can be classed both as a
European and an Asran country. Nevcrtheless, in
vieu, of its hrstory and abovc all the political will
expressed by rts princrpal lcaders and rts most
representative rnstrtutions. nobody can serrously
contend that thrs great countr), docs not have a
European callmg, morcover, because of the geo-
graphic locatron of its caprtal and the fact that
the vast ma.;orrty of its populatron hve u'est of
the Urals, Russra's centre of gravrtv still hcs
wrthm its "European" sector What is more, thc
country's economlc potentral, based on lts vast
natural resources. mrlrtarv mrght and strategic
importance confer on rt a ven, specral rverght of
influencc.
2 Srnce the collapse of the Sovret Union, of
r,l'hich rt consrdcrs rtself to be the marn successor
state, Russra has embarked upon large-scale pol-
itrcal, economrc and socral transformation. It rs
firml1' commrtted to reform as the road to demo-
cratic statehood based on frccdom, human rights
comphance and thc rule of larv. and is
endeavounng to get pohcres off the ground to
estabhsh a free-market s1'stcm rvrthrn the coun-
try'. Such reforms. never eas\/, have also had to
be carried through over a penod rn u'hrch Russra
requested and rvas granted full membershrp of
the Council of Europe. Its accessron has urthout
any doubt helped accelerate the process of
change to a s],stem comparable ri'ith that of its
partners rn that organlsatlon which ls respons-
ible, u'rthrn the pro.lect of European construction,
for definrng dcmocratrc practice and the rule of
law and monrtonng comphance ivith them. Horv-
ever rt ls qulte clear that the reforms under way
are strll far from completron and there rs still
some uncertarnty' about the degrec of change that
rs possible rn a country that rs both a potcntlal
superpower and a patchrvork of territories rvhcre
stabrlity is undoubtedll'a fragile commodrty
3. In any event Russra has completed with-
drawal of its armed forces and nuclear weapons
from German sorl and from other countries rn
central Europc It has, rn comphance rvith inter-
national disarmamcnt agreements, substantiallv
reduced both troop ler,els and the overall volume
of its mrlrtarl, arsenal. the present state of u,hich
rvould not allorv rt to launch a maJor offensivc.
All this, but above all thc politrcal rvill Russia
has expressed on countlcss occaslons to make
progress on the road to coopcration. combrned
rvrth the ongomg devclopment of all sorts of eco-
nomic and mdustrial hnks, has pcrsuaded the
West that it need no longer regard Russra as a
threat
4 After the collapse of the Communrst rc-
grme in the former Warsau, Pact countrres, fol-
lou'cd by the drssolution of the Pact and the
brcak-up of the Soviet Union. the central Euro-
pean countnes as a bodr', once released from a
totalrtanan and incffectrve polrtical system domr-
nated by the Sovret Unron. refocused their for-
ergn pohcies on thc attempt to sccure therr rapid
assrmrlatron rnto European and Euro-Atlantrc
structures such as thc Councrl of Europe, the
European Unron, the Atlantrc Alhance and WEU
5 The countnes rn thc Europcan part of the
former Soviet Unron that acqurred or rcgarned
rndependence. pnmanll the Baltrc states, but
perhaps also, and to varylng dcgrces. Belarus.
Lkraine and Moldova. shog'ed a cornmon rcsolvc
to embark on a search for thcrr oun rdcntrtl' and
on a course rn whrch they, intended to act rn total
freedom rvhrle marnlarnrng proper and good-
nerghbourly relations uith the Russran Fcdcra-
tion Estonra, Latl'ra and Lrthuanra. for therr
part, are resolutelv seekrng to guarantec thetr
sccuntv and rndcpendence b1'Jolnrng the Euro-
pcan Unron and the Atlantrc Alhance Further-
more, these threc countnes verr,' quickly estab-
hshed specral rclatrons ln manv areas u'ith their
Scandrnal'ran nerghbours. partrcularly' Srveden
and Finland Moldova. more rcmote and less ad-
vanced in its developmcnt, is also turnrng its gaze
torvards European organlsatlons and placing
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partlcular emphasis on fostering relatrons wtth
countries that are geographrcally closc and share
rts Latin cultural heritage That leaves Belarus
and Ukraine. Serious tensrons rn Mrnsk have
meant that even the process of democratrc constr-
tutronal change appears to have reached stale-
mate. While events in Belarus have come in for
severe criticism, particularly in the Council of
Europe, the country's authontres are seekmg to
estabhsh closer contacts with the Russian Fed-
eratlon and have even draun up plans for constt-
tutional cooperation in the economrc and political
spheres. Ukrarne, on the other hand, appears to
be try'rng to assert its identity and rndependence
by qurte reasonabll' establishing a balance be-
tween maintaining cordial relatrons with its large
Russian neighbour 
- 
many problems remain un-
resolved, partrcularly in relation to Crrmea, but
the tu,o srdes are endeavourrng to settle them
through dralogue and negotratron 
- 
and develop-
ing closer relations at all levels, rncludrng secu-
rrty, both rvrth the member states of the European
Uruon and NATO and rvrth those tu'o organisa-
tions themselves
6. Under these circumstances, the Russian
Federation, u'here feelings of rsolation 
- 
not to
mention humrliatron over the break-up of the
Sovret Unlon 
- 
still he close to the surface and
u'hose u'estem border is now less than 500 kilo-
metres from Moscou', needs to carve out a new
place for rtself u'ithin the s1'stem of intemational
relatrons, partrcularll'as far as rts secuntl,policy
rs concerned Conversely', the Western countries,
and Europe rn particular. are faced rvrth the need
to agree on the nature of the relatrons thev are
prepared to develop 
- 
and rndeed have an rnterest
in developing 
- 
rvith the successor state to a for-
mer rvorld po\\'er rvhich for many contrnues to
hold that status and which m an!' event u'rll
doubtless be restored to rts former rank in the
future. It is a hugely complex country that is nou'
m the throes of polrtical and economrc upheaval
but in geographrc terms rt rs strll the rvorld's
Iargest country.
7 The solutrons arrived at to date have
tended to vary accordmg to the particular charac-
teristrcs of the orgarusations mvolved. Russia is
fully rntegrated into pan-European structures
such as the OSCE 
- 
and also the Council of
Europe, of which it has been a full member since
early 1996 The Russian Federation has tres with
the European Union through an Agreement on
Partnershrp and Cooperation, srgned on 24 Junc
1994. which came lnto force on I December
1997 In June 1994 the European Unron also
srgned a partnership and cooperatron agreemcnt
with Lkrarne u,hich took effect on I March 1998.
8 After some considerablc difficultr,, a
"Foundrng Act on Mutual Rclations, Coopera-
tron and Securrtl, bctrveen NATO and the Rus-
sran Federatlon" lvas srgned in Paris on 27 May
1997 and the Madnd NATO summrt concluded
in its turn, on 9 July 1997, with the signing of a
"Charter on a Drstrnctrve Partnership between
NATO and Ukrarne"
9 As far as relatrons between Russia and
WEU are concerned. some headrvay has bccn
made both at the levelof the Assembly and of the
mrnrstenal organs Horvever the WEU authoritres
have up to norv sought to avoid therr acqurnng
any formal or rnstitutronahsed character, desprte
repeated requests to that effect from Russra srnce
1994 lt rs to be noted in passmg that on 30 June
1997 WEU srgned an agreement rvrth Ukrarne on
long-haul arr transport In therr Erfurt Declara-
tron of l8 Novembcr 1997, the WEU minrsters
"stressed WEU's readiness to develop further
WEU's relatronship rvrth Russra based on an en-
hanced polrtrcal draloguc and practrcal coopera-
tron Mrnrsters requested the Permanent Councrl
to contrnue to explore further possrbilities for
practrcal cooperatron"
l0 Furthermore, the Greek Presidency of the
Councrl confirmed ln rts programme of rvork that
rt uould pursue cooperatlon u,rth Russra in spe-
cific areas such as long-haul air transport. rvhtlc
it also intended to further enhance WEU's rela-
trons urth Russra by' rdentrfi'rng areas that might
be of rnterest to both sides.
I I WEU nevertheless remarns, at the present
trme. the onlv European organrsatron n'hose rela-
trons urth Russra are not based on officral
agreements or arrangements One may u'ell ask
u'hv thrs should bc. There rvould seem to be little
;ustrficatron for this omrssion and rts absence ts
not helpful and does not serve the interests of
erther WEU or Russra Sharrng thrs vierv, the
Russran Mrnrster for Foreign Affairs, Mr
Pnmakov, proposcd taking a step forward by'
suggestrng that WEU and Russra study together
ll'avs of puftrng therr relations on a formal foot-
rng The WEU Secretary-General responded to




r,r,hrch ln our vlew arc outdatcd and rn-
substantral 
- 
attcmptrng to jusnfu malntalnlng
the status qtto He exprcssed the vierv that WEU-
Russra relations could bc further developed bv
taking account of WEU's role as defined rn thc
22 July, 1997 Declaratron on the role of WEU
and its relatrons rn'rth the European Union and
ri,ith the Atlantrc Alliance "and WEU's and
Russia's mutual interest in contrrbuting to the
establishment of a cooperative European secunty
architecture." "For these reasons" hc goes on to
say "we are not of the view that WEU-Russra
relations need be seen in strict comparison u,ith
Russia's relations rvrth the EU or NATO"
12. Nevertheless, although this rs the crux of
the argument for maintamrng the status quo,
consisting of holding polrtrcal consultations from
trme to trme and dcvcloping cooperatlon ln a
number of specific areas, the least that can be
sard rs that there arc grounds for questioning
rvhether such a pohcy continues to be.yustrficd In
point of fact, grven that the Treaty' of Amsterdam
and the Madnd NATO summrt have redefincd
the role and posrtron of WEU, nou' might bc an
appropnate trme to look agarn at u,hether and to
w'hat extent rt mrght be in WEU's rnterest and
that of rts members 
- 
u'hich rs hou, \\'e see it 
- 
to
make a qualrtatrvc lmprovement rn their relatrons
rvrth Russra
II. Russiu's place in Europe
and the da'elopment of its relations
with the European Union and NATO
13. Consrderatron of thrs rssue rmplres that not
onl1, should Russra's role rn Europe be cxamrned,
but also and more pertrnentll' that of WEU post-
Amsterdam and Madrrd Should Russra be re-
garded as a partner for Europe or an integral part
of rt? This rs undoubtcdly 2 ks1, issue on x'hrch
one mrght expound at length u'rthout an)' cer-
tainty of rcachrng a conclusron to rvhrch there
would be no drssent.
14 If one consrders pan-European coopera-
tron, Russia's full membershrp of the OSCE and
the Council of Europe rs the expressron of a gen-
eral consensus that Russia rs an rntegral part of
that cooperation and fully involved in the deci-
sion-makrng process for any plan of action de-
veloped rvithin the framervork of those institu-
trons. Thrs is tantamount to saying that rn'e have
all accepted that the Russian Federatron should
play, a full part in all aspccts of democratic sc-
cunt)'ln the context of the European construction
pro.lect. As to the prospects for integration in the
framervork of the European Unron and, in respect
of milrtary sccuntv and defence, that of the At-
Iantic Alhance, the questron of uhat place the
Russian Federatron should have arises in drffer-
ent wavs grven the nature of the two projects. but
although the solutrons put into effcct to date are
satisfactory for thc trme berng, they cannot be
regarded as final and urll have to adapt as contr-
nental integratron moves fonvard and coopera-
tion and good-nerghbourly relations take a firm
hold, gradually expungrng the inevrtable conse-
quences of almost half a century of confrontatlon
and cold war.
15. The Rapporteur rs convinced that Russra
u,ill, in the longer term. bc more than.lust a part-
ner of the European Unron and the Atlantrc Alh-
ance but rs a\\'are that thrs remalns a controver-
sial rssue and one to a large extent hnked to
Russra's ou-n development and that of the or-
ganisations referred to. Thc German Chancellor's
address on 7 Februarl' 1998 to the conference on
securltv pohcl' m Munrch provides food for
thought. rn partrcular his statcmcnt that
"Russra belongs to Europe 
- 
hrstorrcallv
and culturalll' stabrlrtl' and securitv rn
Europe cannot be achreved n'rthout Rus-
sra.
The Foundrng Act on which NATO-Rus-
sra relatrons arc based and the Agrcemcnt
on Partnershrp and Cooperatron concluded
betx'een Russra and the European Unron
are most important rnstruments m tcrms of
Russta's rntegratron rnto future European
secuntv structures ( )
Todal' \{'c are embarkrng on a long-tcrm
process I u,ould lmaglne, rf thrngs go u'ell
in the next century, that NATO's and the
EU's relationshrp u'rth Russta could
eventuallv turn mto a real partnership
16 In WEU's case, the issue does not requlre
an immediate solution and could therefore be left
open But rve should ask oursclves u'hether 
- 
rn
rts ou.n long-term rnterests 
- 
WEU can afford not
to set up a more structured relatronshrp u'ith
Russra, given that the latter alrcady, has formal
relatrons rvith the European Union on the basrs of
a partnership and coopcration agreement and has
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dcvcloped an elaboratc system of coopcratron
and consultatron rvrth NATO Thrs questlon
takcs on an addcd drmensron uhen one constders
.1ust horv flexiblc WEU shou'ed itself to be u'hen
rt created vanous categones of status for observ-
ers and assocrate members and partners prectselv
to meet the nced to cooperate rvtth countries that
rvere at drffcrcnt stages m the proccss of Euro-
pean constructton. In hrs report Securuty rn a
wtder Europe reply to the anruol report of the
Counul, Mr Antretter explarns u'hy he proposes
-ver1'lustrfiabh' - that rn thc future there should
be only' t\\'o categortes of membershrp of WEU
one for countrres that have acccded to the modr-
fied Brussels Treaty and the other for countnes
u'hrch ivrll be accorded thc status of assoctate
member on the basrs of ven' sohd legal grounds
that remarn to be specrfied The purpose of thrs
proposal rs to enable those of the 28 countrles rn
the ''WEU famrll'" that so u'rsh to bclong to the
Organisation and take part in rts actlvltlcs As far
as thc Russran Fedcratron IS concerncd. rt should
be rncluded ln an extensive structure of dralogue
and cooperatron enabhng it to stal' tn permanent
contact ri'ith WEU and commensurate rvrth thc
Organisation's rmportance. as WEU cannot be
rclegated to the sidehnes compared u'rth thc
Europcan Unron and NATO shen rt comes to
''reallv rmportant" matters
17 Because u'e do not accept that WEU
should take a back seat and plal' a secondan'
rolc. n'c rntend to address the questron lust rarsed
and come up urth an ans\\'er that rs not onlv
more reahstrc but also more constructrvc To that
end u'e must consider WEU's role rn the context
of rts close ties u'ith a NATO m thc process of
change and a European Unron also in thc throes
of transformatron. beanng m mrnd alu'avs the
responsrbrlrtics assrgncd to WEU under the
modrfied Brussels Treatl'
l8 The Amsterdam Treatl' continues the instr-
tutronal convergence betu'een WEU and the
European Unron alreadv set rn motron under the
Maastncht Treatl', hnkrng estabhshment of a
corrrmon dcfcnce rn thc European Unron and
WEU's possible mtegratron therern to a decrsron
rn the European Councrl. While remairung an
independent organisatron u,rth its own treatv
base. WEU therefore forms an rntegral part of
the Unron's development. provrdrng the latter
urth acccss to operatronal capabilrty' Moreover rt
has thc task of helprng to frame the defence as-
pects of the CFSP and elaboratrng and imple-
mcntlng decrsrons and acttons of thc Europcan
Unron rn the field of cnsls management, for
ri'hrch the European Unron s'rll avarl rtself of
WEU
19 It mrght bc approprrate to consider what
areas of thc common foreign and security policy
are covered by thc Agreemcnt on Partnershrp and
Cooperation concluded betu'een the European
Union and Russia. In the prcamble to this
Agreement the parties affirm mter aha their de-
termination to promote rnternational peace and
securitl, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Accordrng to Article 6 of the Agreement
"A regular polrtrcal dralogue shall bc es-
tabkshed betu'een the Partres uhrch they
rntend to develop and rntensrfu. It shall ac-
companv and consolidate the rapproche-
ment betu'ecn the European Unton and
Russra, support the polrtical and cconomtc
changes undenvav in Russra and contnb-
ute to the cstabhshment of neu, forms of
cooperatron The politrcal dralogue:
- 
shall strenglhen the links betu'een Rus-
sra and the Europcan Unron The eco-
nomlc convergence achrel'ed through
thrs Agreement shall lead to more ln-
tense politrcal relatrons,
- 
shall brrng about an rncreasing conver-
gcnce of posrtrons on intemattonal
rssucs of mutual concern thus increas-
rng securitl- and stabtlttr',
- 
shall forescc that the Parttes endcavour
to coopcratc on matters pertalnlng to
the observance of the prrncrplcs of de-
mocracv and human nghts and hold
consultatrons if necessar]', on matters
related to thcrr due implementatlon".
20 Thrs ven general rvording makes rt possr-
ble for an exchange of vieq's to be estabhshed for
all rnternatronal problems likell' to be of interest
to the tu'o partrcs n'rthout obhgrng them to enter
rnto specific, practrcal commrtments In fact
durrng the first meeting 
- 
held on 27 January
1998 rn Brussels 
- 
of the EU/Russia Cooperatton
Councrl. the mrnisterral bodl' created under thc
Agreemcnt. the forergn mlnrsters of the Fifteen
and Russra drscussed lntcrnatlonal policy and
secuntv rssues such as the European securitl,
archrtccture. developments rn central and eastern
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Europe, the support agrced and coordrnatcd bi,
the European Union and the Russran Fcderatron
for the Mrddle East peace process, thc possrbrlrtl'
of haltrng arms deliveries to Iran. the srtuatron rn
Iraq, and rnrtratives desrgned to consohdate stab-
ilrty rn the Balkans and bnng to an end thc
conflrcts in Albania and the varrous terrrtorres of
formcr Yugoslavra
2l Such dralogue ls certalnly,useful, pnmar-
rll'bccause lt lmproves rnformatron exchange and
could cven lcad to convergent posrtrons on cer-
tain questrons of rnternational policl, However,
rvhrle the rntentron of the Agreement rs to in-
crease secunt)' and stabilrty through polrtrcal
dralogue. rt does not cover the specific areas
identrfied rn thc sectron of the Maastncht Treatv
that deals u.rth the CFSP', or thc areas for rvhicir
WEU has responsrbilrtv In Ma1. 1996, thc Euro-
pean Union set up a plan of actron for Russra
rvhich, among other thrngs. makes prol'rsron for
dralogue urth Russra on matters of Europcan
securrtv and foreign polio', urth emphasrs on the
general aspccts of development of the OSCE.
disarmament and crisis preventron rn the frame-
s'ork of the OSCE and the United Natrons. Thrs
arrangement does not cover the specrfic respon-
srbrlrtres of WEU and rs therefore no substitutc
for drrcct dralogue bctrvcen WEU and Russia.
22 As far as rclatrons betu'een NATO and
Russra are concerncd. the Iatter 
.lorned the Part-
nership for Peace on 22 June 1994 but drd not
agree on an rndrvrdual NATO/Russra partnershrp
programme u'rthrn thc frameu'ork of the PfP until
31 Ma1' 1995 The spccrfic arcas for dralogue
and cooperatron u'ere to rncludc
- 
exchange of rnformatron on thc role of
NATO. mrlrtary doctrrnes, crlsls man-
agement, defence rndustn' converslon
and defence budgets.
- 
consultatlons over prohferatron rssues
relatrng to u'eapons of mass destruc-
tron, rmplementation of the chemrcal
and brologrcal rveapons conventrons.
nuclcar safetv rssues and specrfic crises
rn Europc,
ior for that matter CFSP areas as defined in the
Treag of Amsterdam srgncd three years after the
EU/Russra Agreement
- 
cooperation on pcacekecprng and hum-
anitanan issues.
23 Such coopcratron has found rts most con-
crctc expresslon tn Russra's partrcrpatron rn thc
NATO peacemakrng missron rn formcr Yugo-
slavia Wlth the srgnaturc of the Foundrng Act on
Mutual Relations rn Pans on 27 Mar' 1997 
- co-
operatron betu,cen NATO and Russra acquired a
nerv drmensron Apart from those aspects of the
specrfic dralogue and cooperation programme
mentroncd above, the Foundrng Act hsts the fol-
louing areas for consultatron and cooperation
betueen NATO and Russra.
- Jolnt operatrons, rncluding peacekeep-
rng operatrons, on a case-by,-casc basis,
under the authorrtl, of thc UN Sccuritl,
Council or thc rcsponsrbrlrty, of thc
OSCE and rf Combrned Jornt Task
Forces (CJTF) arc used. partrcrpatron
rn them at an early stage:
- 
arrns control lssues, partrcularlv thc
adaptation of the CFE Treaty',
- 
possrble coopcration rn theatrc mrssrlc
dcfence,
- 
enhanced regronal arr traffic safet1., and
promoting confidence in relatron to atr
defcnce bv erploring possrble coopera-
tlon ln those arcas,
- 
lncreaslng transparcncl,, prcdrctability
and mutual confidcncc regardrng the
srze and roles of rcspcctiv'c conven-
tronal forccs.
- 
recrprocal cxchangcs. as approprrate.




- .lornt exerclses rn civil emergencv pre-
paredness and disaster rehef.
- 
combating terronsm and drug-traffick-
lng.
- 
rmprovrng public understanding of
cvolving relatrons betrveen NATO and
Russra. rncludrng the estabhshment of a
NATO Documentatron Centre or In-
formatron Office rn Moscor,l,
24 Both partres have agrccd that other areas
could be added by' corrmon accord. The future
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development of thrs partnershrp rs of fundamcntal
rmportance to the nature of the relatronshrp that
WEU and its member countrres u'rsh to develop
u,ith Russia and the rnterest the latter may have
in establishing such relatrons. At prescnt a degree
of ambigurtl, surrounds NATO/Russta relatrons
The Founding Act statcs:
"NATO and Russra do not constder each
other as adversarres. They share the goal
of overcoming the vestiges of earlter con-
frontatron and competition and of
strengthenrng mutual trust and coopcra-
tlon "
The tu'o parties reaffrrm therr shared commlt-
ment to build a stable, peaceful and undrvrded
Europe. u'hole and free The atm of the nex' rela-
tionship is to develop a partnership
25. NATO and Russta declare 
.;orntl1, that the1,
are both engaged in a process of transformatron
that rvrll continue
''While preservrng the capabrlrtv to meet
the commrtmcnts undcrtaken in the Wash-
ington Treatl', NATO has expanded and
u'ill contrnue to expand its polrtrcal func-
trons. and has taken on ne\\r mrssions of
pcacekeeprng and cnsrs management
Whrle NATO mcmber states are in the process
of re-examrnrng the Atlantrc Alhance's stratcgrc
concept ln order to ensure that rt rs fullv
consrstent u'rth the neu' situatron, Russra ls
rvorkrng on del'elopment of a ne\\' conccpt of
natronal secuntv and revlslng rts mrlrtary
doctnne "to ensure that [the1'are] fulli conslstent
rvith nerv securltv realrtres''
26. What drrectron rvrll thrs rapprochement
betrveen NATO and Russra take and hou' far u'rll
it go? What are the arcas of drsagrccmcnt') The
Founding Act does not exprcssly identrfr' them
but rather emplovs thc tcrm "Euro-Atlantrc
communrt\," and takcs as rts pornt of departure
the princrple that the securltv of all states belong-
tng to that communrtv rs rndrvisible Conse-
quently', rt devotes several paragraphs to both
NATO's and Russra's endeavours to strengthcn
thc Organisatron for Security and Cooperation in
Europc (OSCE) 
- 
defined as the onll'pan-Euro-
pean secuntl' organrsation and assrgned a kcy
role in European peace and stabrlrtl'
27 In certain arcas hou'ever, sourccs of frrc-
tion persrst, as thc pnncrplcs agrecd by NATO
and Russra for the settlemcnt of drfferences by
peaceful means that both partles undertake to
comply'rvith serve to attest Thess include
- 
rcfrarning from the threat or use of
force agarnst one another other as rvell
as agarnst any other State, rts sover-
clgnt\', terrrtonal integrity or polrtical
mdependence,
- 
respect for the sovereigntv, independ-
ence and terntorial integritl' of all
States and their rnherent rrght to choose
thc means to ensure their ou,n sccurrty
(u,hrch rncludes the freedom to lorn
such mrlrtan' alliances as thel' choosc),
- 
rcspect for the rnvrolabrlrtv of borders
and the nght of peoples to self-determr-
natron.
- 
mutual transparcnc)' ln creatlng and
rmplementing dcfence poho' and mrh-
tarl'doctrrncs.
- 
prcvcntion of conflicts and settlemcnt
of drsputcs bv peaceful means ln ac-
cordancc rrrth UN and OSCE prrn-
crples
28 The NATO member countries' determrna-
tron to presen'c the defence capabrlrty of the
Alhancc based on Artrcle 5 of the Washington
Treatr', rvhrle openrng up the Alliancc to ccntral
Europcan countnes u'hrch u'ere erther former
Warsau' Pact members or formed part of the
terntor)' of the former Sovret Unron. rs evidently'
onc of the prrncrpal bones of contcntron bctu'cen
NATO and Russra u'rth Russra strll mr strfied 
-
after the drssolutron of thc Warsax Pact and the
u'rthdrau'al of Russran troops from ccntral
Europe 
- 
as to prccrscly' rvho the enem)' rs
against uhrch NATO fccls impelled to defend
rtself, rf Russra rs no longcr vterved as an adver-
san' or a threat
29 In hrs address at Noordwr;k on 3l May'
1995. u'hen the rndrvrdual NATO/Russia part-
ncrshrp prograrrunc rr'rthrn thc frameu'ork of the
PfP u,as approved. Mr Kozvrev, the then Rus-
t0
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slan Forergn Minister, put the rssue in thc follow-
rng terms
"lf however one has in mrnd a third-part1,
threat, Russia and NATO could tackle thc
rssue jointly, together x,ith other European
instrtutions, b), determrnrng ways to
counter new challenges".
30. Although NATO has repeatedly, sought to
reassure Russia that its enlargement u,as not
directed against the latter and that rt had no ln-
tention, plan or reason for setting up nuclear ar-
senals or deplofing foreign forces on the new
member states' territones, it has not yet managed
to allay Moscorv's conccrns and ovcrcome rts
resistance. Russia has, hou'ever, accepted that its
relationship rvith NATO on the basis of the
Foundrng Act does not glve rt a right of veto over
NATO action. srmilarly' the arrangements envis-
aged do not in any rvay,restrict NATO's right (or
that of Russia) to take dccrsions and act rnde-
pendentll,. It rvas also agrecd that consultatrons
rvould not extend to the rnternal affarrs of NATO
or its members, or of Russra
31 In short. rt can be sard that the neu' part-
nershrp betrveen NATO and Russia rvrll essen-
ttally', rn the early stages, serve to strengthen
mutual confidence, still undcrmrned by both
srdes' negatlve perceptlons of one another datrng
back to trmes of confrontatron. Ncvertheless rt
should not be forgotten that thc Founding Act
opens up enorrnous vrstas for consultation and
practrcal cooperatlon and provides for highlv
sophrstrcated machrnery' (tu'o meetrngs a )'ear at
forergn and defence mrnrster and chref-of-staff
lcvel, monthly' meetlngs of ambassadors and
milrtary delegates and the estabhshment of
conmlttees and u'orkmg groups)
32 In vrew of those arrangements. one mrght
therefore ask s'hether it is necessary to supplc-
ment them further bv a formahsed system of
WEU/Russia relations, and. more particularll,,
the estabhshment of a RussiaAVEU Consultative
Councrl. as proposed rnrtialll'b1, Mr Kozvrev in
I995 and again in May 1997 u'hen Mr Primakov
took up hrs predccessor's suggestron The Rap-
porteur beheves that the ans\\'er to this question
rs drrectly linked to the importancc rvc ourselves
asslgn to WEU and the confidence rve have in rt.
In hrs opinron a further consultatron mechanism
u'ould not contravene or necessanly duphcate the
onc that already exrsts betrvecn Russra and
NATO On the contrary,, strcngthening coopcra-
tron urth WEU mtght hclp break doun suspicion,
orl procedures and all rn all help both srdcs get to
knorv each othcr better It rvould also lend sup-
port rn Russia rtself to those forces and sectors of
society that are resoluteh, lookrng towards
Europe and therefore towards pcace m Europe.
III. The unsatisfactory development
of relations bebveen llEU
and Russia since 1994
33 Russra has made a request to develop rts
relatrons u'ith WEU this is a politrcal fact and
the reasons that prompted rt to do so must be
anall'sed u,hen searchrng for an appropnate res-
ponse to that request Thcre ma1, rndeed bc an
advantage for Russra to have mstrtutronahsed
relatrons urth WEU rnasmuch as it may rcgard
them as an additional means of keeprng abrcast
of European security and defencc pohcy and ex-
ertrng tnflucnce on the European decrsion-makrng
process. Russra's concern to hold regular polrtr-
cal dalogue u'rth WEU rs thercforc hkelv to be
drrectlv hnked to the use thc WEU Council
makes of rts polrtrcal decrsron-making powers
Moreover, u'e shall see later on that rts request rs
not the only rssue that necds to be addressed be-
cause 
- 
and thrs rs perhaps the most rmportant
aspect 
- 
there rs also thc mattcr of the advantage
for WEU of rnstrtutronahsrng rts relatrons rvith
Russra.
34 It must also bc rcmcmbered that Russra
hopcs not only' for cnhanced polrtrcal dralogue
but also tnvolvement rn one form or anothcr rn
the uork of the WEU subsrdiarv bodres. such as
the Satcllrte Centre and WEAG As stated rn Mr
Baumel's report on WIiU's relafions wtth
Russra2, adopted by thc Polrtrcal Commrttee on
l0 Novcmbcr 1994, rt rvas from that vear on-
u,ards that the Russran authorrtres gave morc
specrfic rndrcatrons of the arcas rn u,hrch the1,
u'ould hke to cooperate u'rth WEU
35 It also emcrges from hrs report that rn thc
course of the samc I'ear the Russran Embassv rn
Paris provided thc Assembly u'rth informatron
concerning a document approl'ed by' thc Russtan
Head of State, u'hrch defined Russra's pohc1,
tou'ards WEU. It u,ould appear from that docu-
11
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mcnt that Russia's ob.;ectrve was to dcvclop spe-
cral partnershrp arrangements urth WEU rvrth a
vren' to symchronrsing the development of coop-
cratron rvrth our Organrsatron and that of rela-
trons bets'een Russra and the Europcan Unron rn
the political and economrc sphercs Russra u,as
not seekrng to emulate the status of WEU's as-
sociate partner countnes but to establish a stable
partnership fittrng into the pattcrn of rts political
and milrtary cooperation rvith u'estern Europe
36 At the trme the Russians made no refer-
ence to therr relations ruth NATO rvhrch werc
still of an rnformal naturc, but in his leftcr to the
WEU Councrl dated 12 Ma1' 1997, Mr Pnmakov
madc clcar that relatrons betu'een Russra and
WEU rn general, and in partrcular the machrneru
for draloguc and consultatron, should be compar-
ablc u'rth "hon our links g,ith the European
Unron and NATO arc takrng shape"
37 In terms of sublccts for draloguc and con-
sultation, the 1994 document referred tnter alta
to peacekeeprng and defence cooperatron, mclud-
rng cooperatron on tactrcal mrssilc defence. Be-
srdes developlng tres urth the Satellrte Centre and
WEAG, the document also advocated rntensrfu-
mg exchanges u'rth the WEU Instrtute for Secu-
ntr,' Studrcs and estabhshrng regular contacts
betu'een thc Duma and thc WEU Assembll'
38 In the meantime, cooperatlon took shapc
betu'een WEU and Russra rn thc frameq'ork of
the Open Skres Treatv although that Trcatv has
strll not been ratrfied b1 the Russran Parhamcnt
The Russran reactron to WEU's proposal for
cooperatron on long-haul air transport *'as also
posltrve The Assemblt'can but regret that rt rvas
not rnformed of the content of the WEU Coun-
ctl's replv to Russran proposals regardrng arma-
ments cooperatron
39 With rcfcrence to peacckecpmg, Mr
Prrmakov's letter states "rve thrnli that our coop-
eratron tn peacekceprng is promisrng. Our mrh-
tary have posrtrvelv recerved the WEU readiness
to cooperate n'rth Russra rn peacekeeping opera-
tions u'hrch rull be pursued bi' the Union
The Mrnrstcr goes on to make reference to
WEU's rntention, as stated in a prevrous leffer
from the Secretan' General (of ivhich the As-
sembly' rs unfortunatelv once agarn unaware of
the content) to lnvrte Russran observers to exer-
crses conducted b1, WEU He also suggcsts hcre
that WEU and Russra launch a dialogue u'rth a
vtcu' to estabhshrng contacts in the milrtary
sphcrc
40 Whilc thc WEU Council rs prepared to
consrder the possrbilitl, of openrng WEU exer-
crses to Russian observers on a case-by,-case
basrs, rts reactron to estabhshing regular dialogue
in the militarl' sphere is less clear-cut and Rus-
sla's proposal for the creatron of a WEU-Russia
Consultative Councrl for coordmatrng coopera-
tton rn all spheres 
- 
polrtical, parhamentarl,,
mrlrtary and scientrfic 
- 
met rvrth a rather cool
receptlon, ri-ith the WEU Secretary-General rert-
erattng that the dralogue could be enhanced
through the usual channels, in other x'ords vra
the Russran ambassador rn Brussels.
4l The WEU Sccretary,-General nevertheless
strcssed that the Council valued highly "the de-
vclopment of parliamentan' contacts between the
Duma and the WEU Assembll', and [w,e] rvill,
from our srde, take el'ery opportunrtl'to encour-
age the WEU Asscmblv to mtensrfu such con-
tacts and hope the Russian Government rvould do
hkouse u'rth the Duma''
42. Accordrng to a WEU Councrl press re-
lcasc. the 28 members of the Permanent Councrl
of Western European Unron met Mr Vrtall,
Churkrn. the Ambassador of thc Russran Federa-
tlon, rn Brusscls on 20 January 1998. No rnfor-
matron rvas released about what rvas discussed at
thrs mcetrng, u'hrch accordrng to the press release
"focuscd on issues relating to European secunt\',
and the currcnt state of dralogue and cooperatron
bctuccn WEU and thc Russian Federatron"
Horvcver reports from unofficral sources suggcst
that thc Russran representatlve confirmed on thrs
occaslon that Russra \\'as prepared to organrse an
antr-mrssile defence svstem in conlunction w'ith
WEU, that x'ould cover the rvhole of Europe, and
that the Duma had set up a pernanent delegatron
to the WEU Assembll'.
43 The Assemblv has argued on prrncrple that
WEU and lts range of mmrstenal and parhamen-
tarl' bodics constitute a x'hole and that rt u,ould
be diffrcult for the Assembll'to confer on a parl-
lamcnt a status not commensurate u,ith that
granted b1' the Council to the government of the
countn' concemed Hou.evcr the Assembly can
make recommendatrons to the Council in that
connectron. In terms of the Assembly's relation-
ship rvrth Russia, in December 1994, Assemblv
Recommcndalon 574, based on the in-depth as-
T2
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sessment containcd ln thc rcport submrttcd by Mr
Baumcl on behalf of thc Polrtical Commrttce.
was conveved to the Councrl. The first tu'o para-
graphs of rts opcratrve tcxt recommendcd thc
Councrl to
- 
"Offer the Russran Federatron perrna-
nent cooperation, rncluding a regular
s1'stem for informatron, dialogue and
polrtrcal consultatron at ministerral
level and at that of the Charrmanship-
rn-Office. the Secretary-Gcneral and
senlor officials of the mmrsterial organs
of WEU.
- 
Determrne, rn coordrnatron urth the
Russian authorities. the specrfic areas
rn u,hrch WEU mrght offer the Russran
Federatron practrcal cooperatron that
might rnclude questrons u,rthrn the
pun/re\\' of WEAG and possibll/ spacc
questrons . "
44. Paragraph 6 ofthc operatrve text proposcd
that the Councrl estabhsh srth Ukrarnc (and
Belarus u'hrch at the trmc u'as strll carn'ing out
democratrc reforms prror to thc senous disputes
that arose later) relatrons srmrlar to those pro-
posed rn the paragraphs crted above Although
the Council statcd in rts reph' to that recorunen-
datron that ''thc rclatrons mentroned ln para-
graphs I and 2 of thrs recommendatron alreadl,
appll'to Russra and Ukraine ". it drd not set up
svstematlc dralogue al minrsterral level but
merelv maintarned sporadrc contact at ambassa-
dor level
45 As far as parhamentary relatrons \\'crc
concerned- rn Decembcr 1994 the Asscmbly
adopted Order 95 rnvitrng rts Presrdentral
Commrttee
"l To take a dccrsron allou'rng the ex-
change of vreu,s started u,rth the tu,o
chambers of thc Russran Parliament to bc
pursued on the basrs of rcgular mcetlngs,
specrfi,rng the regularitv and u'avs and
means of the partrcrpation of the commrt-
tees of the Assembll' rn such meetrngs,
2. To ask the President of the Assembly
to transmrt appropriate proposals to the
Presrdents of thc trvo chambers of the
Russian Parliament .. ".
46 Although no fornral follorv-up actron to
that Ordcr rvas takcn. thc Assembly rnvitcd ob-
servers from thc Duma to rts 1995 and Februan'
1996 scssrons and the Presrdcntral Commrttcc
decrded to rssuc rnvrtatrons rcgularll'. from June
of that vear and for subsequent sesslons, to thc
same parhamcntary obsen'crs as had attended the
earher sessions A Russian delcgation attended
thc extraordrnan, scsslon held m London on 22-
23 Februan' 1996. and the ordinary scssrons that
same )'car. Representatrves of the Assembll took
part in a semlnar organrsed by,the Dunta m Mos-
co\\' rn iate November 1996 and a dclegation of
thc Russian Parhamcnt attended the colloquy
organrsed by the Polrtrcal Committcc rn Athcns
on ll-12 March 1997 Frnalll', on 5 Nor,cmber
1991 a delcgation of Russran parhamentarrans
had a mcetrng u'rth thc Dcfence, Polrtrcal and
Technologrcal and Aerospacc Commrttees at thc
seat of thc Assemblv rn Pans Hou'er,'cr, no
Russran parhamentan' dclegatron \\-as mvrtcd to
attend the June 1997 scssron The reiatronshrp
the Assembll'has burlt up s'rth thc Russran Parl-
lament to datc therefore consrsts cntrreh' of ad
hoc rnt,fiatrons and the Duma. hke the Ukrainc
Parhament. docs not benefit from a status of anv
krnd rn the WEU Asscmbll, notu'rthstanding rts
cndeavours to sccurc one. In Aprrl 1996. the
Russran Embassy rn Pans informcd the Assem-
bli' that thc Intcrnatronal Affarrs Commrltee of
the Duma had rn fact sct up a pennancnt delcga-
tron to the Assemblr of WEU
IV. The need to deepen and
institutionalise Russia's relations
with hoth the Council und the Assemhly
47 The Rapportcur rs convmced that thrs
sltuatron cannot contrnuc to obtarn erther at As-
sembll' or Councrl ler,'el A nurnber of arguments
can be advanced rn favour of a greater degree of
formalrtl' rn WEU's relatrons u'rth Russia Fol-
lorving thc srgnature of the Amstcrdam Treatv, it
became plarn that a corrrmon defcnce u'ould not
be achreved rn the foreseeable future rn the
framervork of thc f:uropean Unron Rather. WEU
r.r'rl1 gradualll'becomc the defcncc component of
the European Unron. rn hne u'rth the arm thc
WEU member statcs set themsclvcs rn their
l0 December l99l Declaration and rihrch they
exprcssll, reaffirmcd rn the WEU Mrnrsterial
Councrl's Declaratron of 22 Julv 1997. appcnded
l3
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to thc Frnal Act of thc rntergovcrnmcntal confer-
cnce u'hrch culmrnatcd rn the srgnaturc of the
Amsterdam Treatl,on 2 Octobcr 19911
48 WEU, although an integral part of Euro-
pean Unron devclopment, u,ill remaln an mdc-
pendent organlsatlon. urth lts o\\n Council and
Assembly
49 WEU, rn rts configuratron of 28 countrrcs
that are involvcd in its u'ork commensurate rvrth
therr status, rs the forerunner of tomorrou's sc-
curitv and dcfence Europc WEU is therefore an
essentral factor in burldrng a European securitv
archrtecture rn the q'idcr sense. of x'hich Russia
ls an lmportant elemcnt In a srtuation u'here the
rangc of interlockrng European organlsatlons
u'rth complementan' rcsponsrbtlrtres have formal-
rscd therr relatrons u'rth Russra, it can surelv be
ln no-one s lnterest to cxclude WEU from that
process or for rts contacts sith Russra to bc re-
stricted lo ad hoc cncounters.
50 As far as rts role in relatron to NATO rs
concerned, WEU's 22 Jul5' 1997 Declaratron
reaffirms that the Organisatron ls an essentrai
elemcnt of the development of the European sc-
curi6' and defence rdcntrtv u'rthrn the Atlantrc
Alliance in accordance u'rth the Parrs Declaratron
and u'rth the decisrons taken b1'thc NATO mrnrs-
ters ln Berhn WEU also u'ants to plav an actrvc
part in conflrct preventron and crisis managcmcnt
as provrdcd rn the Petcrsberg Declaratron It has
commrtted itself to devcloprng its role as the
European polrtrco-mrlrtan' bodl' for cnsrs man-
agement usrng the asscts and capabrlrtrcs made
avarlable bi'WEU natlons on a natlonal or mul-
trnatronal basrs and hal'rng recoursc. u'hen ap-
proprrate. to NATO's assets and capabrlrtrcs un-
der arrangements bcrng u'orked out In thrs con-
text, the WEU Mrnrsters reaffirmed that WEU
uould also support thc Unrted Natrons and the
OSCE m therr crisrs-management tasks.
-51 The Foundrng Act betu'ecn Russra and
NATO provrdcs both for consultatrons on Jolnt
peacekeeprng operations undcr the authontl' of
the LN or the responsrbrlrtv of thc OSCE and. rf
combrned 
.;oint task forces (CJTF) are used rn
such cascs, particrpatron in thcm at an earlv
stage Thc cases referred to are specrficalh.thosc
rvherc an operatron rs to be conducted under the
polrtrcal control and strategrc drrcctron of the
WEU Councrl If Russra u'rshes to partlclpate ln
such operatrons, there rs all the more reason to
make provrsron for trmell' consultatron u,rth
WEU
52 Of course there ivill be thosc among us
u,ho rvill contlnue to ask u'hether, practrcal coop-
eration in areas that are specrfically WEU's rc-
sponsibility asidc, the establishment of a regular,
formal polrtical draloguc betrveen WEU and
Russra might not run the nsk of duplicatrng thc
u'ork of the NATO-Russia Permanent Jornt
Councrl which alreadl' covers all areas of rnterest
to WEU and Russia If ri'e look further into the
mattcr rt becomes clear that such rs far from be-
rng the case, any more than NATO and WEU
duplicate one another. In the first place, NATO
is a Euro-Atlantic organisation whose purpose
continues to be to provide a collective defence
under tire terms of the Washington Treaty, based
rn partrcular on support from the pou'erful
Unrted States mrlrtarv machine NATO-Russra
rclatrons are strll vcn, much coloured bv Russra's
abrdrng drstrust of that machine u,hich. rn Rus-
sia's eves, contrnues to makc steadl' rnroads to-
u'ards Russra's borders. rn the u'ake of NATO
enlargement The Russians do not have the same
susplclons of WEU, in its present or rts enlarged
form Therc rs a fear in some quarters that Rus-
sra mrght tr), to use such formal relations as mav
exrst u'rth WEU to try and create a breach bc-
trveen Europe and the Unrted States and ueakcn
thc Atlantrc Alhancc And rn an intervrcrv u'rth
the Cornere della Sera on 8 February last. thc
Russran Presrdent drd go so far as to revcal hrs
countn"s rntention of bccoming a full mcmbcr of
all thc rnstrtutrons rrorkrng for European rntegra-
tlon ln an effort to couuter United Statcs domi-
natlon and rts monopoly, But ue must not be
afrard of this debatc; on the contran \\'e our-
selves should be helping thc Russrans galn a
better understandrng of the \\/ay we work and of
our prospects so that they can eventually be rnte-
grated rn a frameu'ork u'e should share *,rth
them Furtherrnorc, Russran lnterests are not the
onlv ones at stake WEU's rntercsts and those of
tts membcr countrres also comc rnto rt Definrng
those mterests rn rclatron to Russra is not alway,s
casv because opinron rs not necessarily unanr-
mous on thc role and place of Russia rn Europe,
or. even after Amsterdam and Madnd. on rvhat
WEU's role and tasks should be.
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53. Therefore it is esscntral to make thc cffort
to dcfine WEU's intcrcsts vrs-a-vrs Russia if we
u'ant to prevcnt Europc's sole defence organlsa-
tron laggrng bchind the changes in the decrsron-
making process that arc bcrng formulated and
approved in other fora, wrth Russia's involvc-
ment, but in the absencc of that of WEU.
54 In rts Ostenda, Pariss, and Erfurt6 Declar-
atrons the WEU Councrl recalled "the importancc
of the development of relatrons u,ith Russra
corresponding to lts size, capabrlitres and strate-
gic importance". The last of them goes on to say,
most appositely, that Russra (and [Ikratne) play,
an essential role rn Europe's securitl, and stabil-
ity'. Equally, WEU rtself must make its position
vrs-a-vrs Russra clear in l'ierr' of rts asprration to
be the precursor of a Europcan defcnce. For al-
though u'rthout Russra there can be no guarantee
of secunty and stabilrtv for Europe, the Euro-
pean defence that WEU stands for rs no less vrtal
an elcment of that guarantee
55 In order to bring about a meeting of mrnds
betrveen Europc and Russia in this sphere, rt q,rll
not suffice for the WEU Permanent Councrl or
Secretary,-General to rndulge in the occasional
cxchange of vieus Regular polrtrcal dialogue rs
u'hat rs needed 
- 
and an agreement putting that
dralogue on an officral basrs This could, it rs
true, be of a less formal nature than those Russia
has negotrated urth the European Union and
NATO To organrse a regular dralogue there is
no obligatron to set up a WEU-Russia Consulta-
trve Councrl as our Russian contacts appear to
ses rt The NATO-Russra Foundrng Act grves the
latter a pnvrleged status m NATO, u'hilc the
central European countnes ullch have not been
invited to 1om NATO are havmg to make do rvith
mvolvement alongsrde Russra rn the Partnership
for Pcace and the Euro-Atlantrc Partnership
Councrl The NATO Joint Councrl consists onh,
of the l6 member countrres plus Russia. In the
European Union the forcign mrnrsters of the Fif-
teen and Russia makc up the Cooperatron
Council
56 The posrtron is different rn WEU, u'here
several categories of status exrst alongsrde one
a Assembly Document 1550, l9 March 1996
s Assemblv Document 1573. l3 May 1997.
6 Assembly Document l5g't , 20 November 1997
anothcr WEU has granted ten central Europcan
countrres assoclate partncr status m ordcr to con-
solidatc therr rntegratron rn the Organrsatron and
tnvolvement rn rts u'ork The WEU Councrl
thereforc sits at regular rntcrvals at 28 and con-
sultatrons betrvcen the Permanent Councrl and
thc Russran representatrvc take place rvrthrn that
frameu'ork Whcn givrng such contacts a more
formal basis, it is perhaps not essentral to set
conditions for Russra that are stnctly rdentical to
those applyng to thc assocrate partners One so-
lutron, whrch does not automatrcalll, exclude oth-
ers. u,ould be 
- 
as has becn suggcsted in some
quartcrs 
- 
for the ershvhile Forum of Consulta-
tion, ivhich brought together WEU and the ccn-
tral European countrrcs pnor to the latter acqurr-
ing associatc partner status. to bc revrved for the
purpose of managing relatrons urth Russra.
57 . Under the prescnt clrcumstances, the pn-
man' alm must be to sct up a system for rnfor-
mation exchange and pcrmanent mutual dralogue
u,ith Russra That svstem could bc estabhshed by'
means of a documcnt rnstrtutrng an rnformatron.
dralogue and cooperatlon programme betu'ecn
WEU and Russra (a srmrlar document definrng
arcas for draloguc and cooperatron uas srgncd
bctu'een NATO and Russra in 1994) Thc first
part of the programme could deal u,ith arrange-
mcnts for rcgular rnformation exchange and top-
ics to be addresscd. a second mrght set out pro-
vlslons govcrrung polrtical draloguc on mattcrs of
common rntcrest u'hrlc a thrrd mrght be devoted
to arcas u,here there could be practrcal coopcra-
tron and hor,r' rt u'ould be achrcved
58 Such an approach n'ould bring WEU rnto
a much closer relationshrp u'rth Russra u'rthout
the need for au'kq'ard drscussrons over the exact
status the lattcr should havc The Assemblv
could hkervise develop rts rrorkrng relatrons u'rth
the Duma rn parallel urthout bcing obhged to
folloii' to the letter the model adopted b1, thc
Council On thrs pornt the Rapporteur puts some
hope rn a thorough studl' of positrons set out re-
ccntll, by certain members of the Permanent
Councrl of WEU
59 Therc rs rvrdespread behef rn the Councrl
that rn rts relatrons rvrth Russra the Assembly has
comparatrvcll, greater freedom of manoeuvre.
There are cven those rvho pornt to the Assem-
bl1"s indepcndent porver of decrsion rn this re-
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spcct and thcre is rn fact a hrstortcal prccedcnt
u'hrch has provcd rts u'orth and takcn on ovcrrtd-
rng rmportancc rn thc proccss of cxtcndrng the
Councrl of Europc to*'ards thc central and cast-
ern parts of thc contrncnt It conccrns the status
of spccial guest crcated bi rts Parltamcntan'
Assemblv and grantcd to parlraments of countnes
rushrng to drau' closer to the organisation but
u'hose govcrnments rvould have found lt very
drfficult to obtain an rnvrtatlon to take part on a
regular basis rn the u'ork of the tntergovcrnmen-
tal structure of the Councrl of Europc There ts
no doubt that thc Assemblv holds dear the rndc-
pendence granted tt under the modrfied Brussels
Treatl But rf rt drd dccrde to takc indcpendent
action to rnstrtutronahse a pemranent procedurc
of cooperatron u'rth both charnbcrs of the parha-
ment of the Russran Federatron. tt u'ould hal'c to
ensurc rn so domg that rt rctatned lnaxtmum
credrbrhh' and effectrvcness and this rt could only'
do bv not actlng counter to the urll of the
Councrl but rather rn agreement utth rt and b1
being flerrblc rn the tnterests of thc Organrsatlon
as a rvhole Thrs course of actton. the detarls of
rrhrch urll be proposcd elsovhcrc. should not be
a substrtutc for a pcrmanent status placrng rela-
trons betu'cen thc Russran Fedcratton and WEU
on an rnstrtutronal footrng but should rather be
scen as a stepprng stonc on thc uav to obtatntng
that status rvhrch should not be long rn comlng
60 If the rdcas and proposals sct out tn the
foregorng paragraphs arc favourablr reccrved bv
thc Councrl. thcrc nrll be no nsk of a nft bc-
tu'een thc pohcr and anv coursc of actron fol-
Iou-cd bv thc Assembll' or the Councrl On thc
contran. therc needs to be some sort of cffcctrvc
comphcrtv betueen thc tu-o rn thc rntcrcsts of
\\'EU as a s'hole Thrs u'ould rcqulrc closer hnks
betrrccn thc Assemblv and thc Councrl. u'rth the
Secrctan'-General for hrs part takrng actlon to
ensurc that rclatrons u.tth the Assemblv arc 
.;ust
as harmonrous as thosc ruth the Counctl Come
rrhat mar. the ob.;ectrvc of thrs report ts to cnsure
that relatrons betucen WEU and the Russran
Fcdcratron are grvon a normal. effecttre and
comprehcnsrr e rnstrtutional framcu'ork as soon
as possrblc In the meantlme thcre ts an urgent
nccd to sct up a formal arrangcment cnabhng
Russran parhamcntarrans to partlclpate regularlv
and on a perrnanent basis in the work of our
Assembly u,hose competent bodies should gct
doxn to thc u'ork of drarvrng up that arrangc-
ment rmagrnatrvell' and rn a sprrit of flexibrlrty'.
Lct us be in no doubt that thc presencc of reprc-
sentatrves of the Russtan people among us can
but hclp consohdate democrattc valucs and prac-
ticcs in therr great countr)' and thercbv thc very
credrbrh[' of WEU itself As of norv the Asscm-
b11' should contlnuc to issue regular invttattons
for a delcgation from Russta to attend rts ses-
srons and perhaps mcetings of tts matn commtt-
tccs as u'cll. Morcover. rcciprocal vtstts betrveen
delegatrons of the Assembll' and the Duma be-
tu'cen sessions, and thc holdrng of colloqures and
scminars. should contrnuc and take place morc
oftcn
6l Whrle rccognrsrng that there are manv
fundamental drffcrences betuccn the sttuatton tn
the Russran Fcderatron and that rn Lhrarnc (in
terms of srze. potentral. prospccts, etc ). tt ts ner'-
erthclcss thc case that untrl nou' WEU has put
thcsc tu'o countries rnto thc same catcgon',
namch' that of "countncs that are vcry' mtcrcstcd
in u'orkmg u'rth us and ruth u'htch rt ts essential
that u'c dcvclop relatrons as long as thosc rela-
trons are confined to sporadtc. onc-off. relatrvelv
rnformal contacts " Lrkc Russta. l,rkrarne has
cstabhshed rnstttuttonal rclations u'tth the
Councrl of Europe. thc European Unton and
NATO Lrkc Russta. tt ts absolutch, s55..,,.1 
-
albcrt rn a drfferent \\'a\' 
- 
to the securttl' of
Europe urth rvhtcir WEU rs supposcd to concern
rtself Ukrarne has asked to bccome an associatc
partner of WEU and thc Councrl of WEU has for
rts part rccognrscd lt as an important partncr for
our Organrsatron Thrs is u-hy rt rvould appcar
cssentral for a separatc rcport to propose specral
arrangements to tn', bv makrng rt officra1. to tm-
provc the status Ukrarne has vts-i-vrs our Or-
ganrsatron and rn partrcular that of the Rada (thc
Parhament rn Kiev) r'rs-a-vis the Assembll' It
u'ould perhaps be appropnatc to offer I-fkrarne
thc status our Asscmbll' mrght estabhsh for the
Russran Parhamcnt. tf onlv so as not to make
relatrons u'rth thc latter a u'hollv excepttonal
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